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Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States,
and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most
Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in
the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor, and investigate
how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ
allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a
significant positive impact on registration.
Judd B. Kessler














The majority of transplanted organs in the United States come from deceased donors, 
whose organs are transplanted into patients following the donor‘s death.
1 Despite the need for 
organs (over 110,000 patients are currently awaiting organ transplants in the United States
2) and 
the ease of registering as a donor (a few clicks on a website or checking a box when getting a 
driver‘s license), only 40.3% of individuals over the age of 18 in the United States are registered 
as organ donors.
3  
Changes in organ allocation procedures can influence the supply of transplantable organs. 
One line of research, concerning kidney exchange among incompatible patient-donor pairs, has 
investigated how matching mechanisms for live donors can increase the number of kidney 
transplants (Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver 2004, 2005a,b, 2007; Roth et al. 
2006; Susan L. Saidman et al. 2006; C. Bradley Wallis et al. 2011) and has led to a number of 
new practices and institutions.
4 Kidney exchanges match incompatible patient-donor pairs to 
other incompatible patient-donor pairs, allowing for exchanges and also for chains of donation 
that start with an undirected donor and that increase the number of transplants that live donation 
can achieve (Michael A. Rees et al. 2009; Itai Ashlagi et al. 2011) Thus allocation policies can 
increase the donation rate of live donors as well as deceased donors. Despite a growing (but still 
small) number of transplants resulting from kidney exchange, the kidney waiting list has 
continued to grow and shows no signs of slowing down. For kidneys in the United States, Table 
1 lists the number of donors, transplants, and the number of people on the waiting list. Kidneys 
have longer waiting lists than other organs because dialysis can keep patients in need of kidney 
transplants alive for a time while waiting, but the need for other organs is great as well, and 
patients who do not promptly receive a transplant often die while waiting.  
In addition, economists and others have discussed the possibility of cash markets for 
organs, in which kidneys could be bought and sold to address the current excess demand for 
kidneys. Proposals to introduce monetary payments for organs are constrained by concerns about 
the morality and ethicality of such practices, and repugnance towards cash markets for organs 
                                                           
1 Based on OPTN data as of July 29, 2011 (see http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp).  
2 For example, over 89,000 are on the waiting list for a kidney. Waiting list numbers are based on Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) data as of July 29, 2011. 
3 Based on the Donate Life America National Donor Designation Report Card 2011 (which can be found at 
http://donatelife.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/DLA-Report-BKLT-30733-2.pdf). 
4 For example, the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) and the Alliance for Paired Donation 
(APD). Following the passage of new federal legislation in 2007, plans are underway for a national exchange, which 
is running a pilot program that began in October 2010. 3 
 





  Here we focus on deceased donation and mechanisms to increase the number of 
individuals registering to be organ donors (individuals who agree to donate those of their organs 
that are usable in the event of an untimely death). Deceased organ donation is a natural place to 
focus attention since the registration rates for organ donation are rather low (40.3 percent 
nationally and, for example, only 7 percent in Texas and 15 percent in New York, the second and 
third most populous states respectively).
5 Since next of kin can provide consent for donation at 
time of death, donation rates of eligible deceased donors are higher than registration rates, 
although still well below 100 percent. In addition, the gains to generating more deceased organ 
donors are substantial: one deceased donor can provide multiple vital organs (including kidneys, 
liver, heart, pancreas, lungs, and intestine) as well as tissues (including corneas, skin, heart 
                                                           
5 Based on the Donate Life America National Donor Designation Report Card 2011 (which can be found at 
http://donatelife.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/DLA-Report-BKLT-30733-2.pdf). 4 
 
valves, cartilage, bone, tendons, and ligaments). Finally, while exchanges and donor chains can 
increase the number of transplanted kidneys, there is essentially no possibility of live donation 
for other solid organs such as the heart, pancreas, and intestine, and not much transplantation of 
live donor lungs or livers. Live donation of blood and of bone marrow is very feasible, and has 
been the subject of considerable study. (Recent work on blood donation has investigated whether 
incentives for blood donors can be effectively used to increase donations, or whether the 
donations suffer from a ―crowding out‖ (see Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis 2008; Carl 
Mellstrom and Magnus Johannesson 2008; Lacetera, Macis, and Robert Slonim 2009).
6 Research 
on bone marrow donations by Ted C. Bergstrom, Rodney J. Garratt, and Damien Sheehan-
Connor (2009, 2011), Frédérique, A. Fève and Jean-Pierre Florens (2005), and Fève et al. (2007) 
argues that fewer individuals are on the bone marrow registry than is optimal.)  
  In this paper we consider deceased organ allocation policies that give priority for 
receiving organs to people who are themselves registered donors (and have been registered for 
some time). Such policies provide an incentive for registering to be an organ donor. This kind of 
donor-priority system is in use in Singapore (since the 1986 passage of their Human Organ 
Transplant Act
7) and is being implemented in Israel (following passage of a 2008 organ 
transplant law
8). Singapore has an opt out system, in which everyone is by default a donor in the 
national registry, and any citizen or permanent resident of Singapore who opts out of being an 
organ donor gets lower priority for deceased donor organs in the event that they need one. Israel 
has an opt in system, in which (once the system is fully implemented) anyone who has registered 
to be a deceased donor at least three years earlier will receive priority. Such donor-priority 
policies generate an incentive for becoming a donor within the organ donation system and do not 
require additional incentives from outside of the system. A related approach is being attempted 
in the U.S. by a private club called Lifesharers, which prioritizes deceased donations of organs 
                                                           
6 Both Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) and Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2009) investigate the hypothesis of 
Richard M. Titmuss (1970) that paying for blood donation might crowd out the altruistic reasons for giving and lead 
to less donation. While Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) find evidence of crowding out in a field experiment on 
blood donation in Sweden, Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2009) do not find crowding out on blood donations from 
observational data and a field experiment in America. Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis (2008) find that giving 
recognition to donors increases the number of blood donations and the timing of the donations. 
7 The Human Organ Transplant Act can be found at http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/legislations.aspx?id=1672 
8 The proposed Israeli policy gives priority to the individuals and family members of those who have signed donor 
cards or made live organ donations (news stories can be found at 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/174514.php and http://www.jpost.com/HealthAndSci-
Tech/Health/Article.aspx?id=195354). The details of the implementation of this program have been highly contested 
and were still being debated at the time of final submission of this paper. 5 
 
by its members to its members who need them. Lifesharers is not part of the national allocation 
system, so it requires individuals to opt into the club in addition to registering as a donor, and 
gives priority access to only those organs donated by members of the club.
9  
One strategy discussed for increasing registration rates in the United States is to change 
to an opt out system in which those who take no action are assumed to be donors at death, as in 
Singapore, Spain (which has the highest rate of deceased organ recovery), and other European 
countries (most of which have lower rates of organ recovery and transplantation than the United 
States). This policy is an interesting and important one to consider but may have legal 
consequences that make it less effective at increasing final donation rates than increasing 
registration rates. We discuss this again in the conclusion.   
  This paper investigates incentives to donate by means of an experimental game that 
models the decision to register as an organ donor. The main manipulation is the introduction of a 
priority rule, inspired by the Singapore and Israeli legislation, which assigns available organs 
first to those who had also registered to be organ donors. Another experimental condition 
replicates the incentive effects of the priority rule (in expectation) but provides organs by a 
standard waiting list. A final condition institutes a simple discount in the cost of agreeing to be 
an organ donor. 
  Results from our laboratory study suggest that providing priority on waiting lists for 
registered donors has a significant positive impact on donation.
10 We are able to replicate most of 
the benefit with a rebate that provides the same incentive for donating as priority, and with a 
discount in the cost of donation, although only when they are introduced after the subjects have 
made donation decisions a number of times. When the policies are introduced at the start of the 
game, the priority rule outperforms an equivalent change in the cost of donation. 
It may be helpful to pause for a moment and think about what kinds of hypotheses 
relevant to organ donation can be investigated in a laboratory experiment that does not involve 
actual organ donation decisions. While there are obviously important questions related to organ 
donation that cannot be studied in the abstract, there are also important aspects of the actual 
                                                           
9 As of July 2011, Lifesharers‘ membership is less than 15,000 and there has not yet been a transplant on the 
Lifesharers network (see http://www.lifesharers.org/).  
10 In our experiment, registration results in donation whenever the registered organ donor becomes deceased and a 
recipient is available. We will discuss in the conclusion some of the legal and practical gaps between registration as 
an organ donor and successful donation and transplantation. 6 
 
organ donation decision that cannot be reliably or systematically manipulated, but which can be 
manipulated in the lab.  
To see both sides of this, consider the issues that arise in modeling in the laboratory the 
costs associated with the decision to donate an organ after death. The costs of registering to be an 
organ donor are difficult to identify and to manipulate in the field. These costs may include 
worries that doctors will not work as hard to keep organ donors alive or that organs will be 
removed prematurely, and there may be visceral issues in thinking about actual organ donation 
such as discomfort in thinking about one‘s own death. In the laboratory, monetary costs can be 
imposed and manipulated, to model to some level of approximation the costs experienced by 
donors. And since compensation for donation is not allowed by United States law,
11 cash rebates 
or cash transfers are not possible for actual organ donation decisions, so conditions that 
manipulate the net costs of registering as an organ donor with cash payments can only be run in 
the laboratory. 
 So in the laboratory we do not use real organs, but we impose real (monetary) costs. The 
cost of registering to be a donor in the experiment is imposed and denoted in dollars (it decreases 
cash payment from the experiment). We take advantage of the opportunity to manipulate the cost 
of donation by running two conditions (discount and rebate) that decrease the costs of registering 
to be a donor to better understand why the priority rule generates an increase in the number of 
donors. While a donor-priority rule can be implemented in the world and in the lab, cash rebates 
and discounts cannot be implemented outside of the lab, but they allow us to test hypotheses 
about which features of the priority rule are responsible for increasing registration rates in the 
lab. 
While organ transplantation is a private good—only one person can receive each organ—
it is useful to think of the organ donor registry as resembling a public good, since ex ante the 
pool of registered organ donors provides organs for the pool of potential recipients (from which 
no medically eligible candidate can be excluded under present US law). Even though an 
individual who is a deceased organ donor will not get to be an organ recipient, a larger pool of 
potential donors benefits everyone, including potential donors who end up needing organs rather 
than providing them. In other words, registering to be an organ donor resembles a public good ex 
                                                           
11 The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 states, in part: ―it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly 
acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation.‖ 
(Section 301, National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. 274e 1984) 7 
 
ante that is a private good ex post.
12 It may be that the donor-priority organ allocation policy 
increases registration rates in part because the allocation rules allow for non-donors to be 
excluded (or to have a smaller probability of receiving an organ), effectively turning the registry 
into a club good and generating an incentive to become a donor. We investigate the impact of 
this incentive in a simple model in Section IV.
13 
  Our laboratory environment allows us to study the incentive issues involved in this type 
of public good, abstracted away from the important but complex sentiments and institutional 
details associated with actual organs. Results suggest that rewarding contributors with first 
access to the ex post private goods generated by the ex ante public good—by transforming the 
public good into something more like a club good—may generate increased contribution in 
public good environments of this form.    
 
I. Experimental Design 
In the experiment, subjects made a decision modeled on the decision to register as an 
organ donor. In the experiment there is no difference between registering (in advance) to donate 
and being an available donor at death, and we will refer to this decision as ―donating‖. The 
instructions to subjects were stated in abstract terms, not in terms of organs. Subjects started each 
round with one ―A unit‖ (which can be thought of as a brain) and two ―B units‖ (representing 
kidneys). Each subject earned $1 in each period in which they had both an active A unit and at 
least one active B unit (representing a flow of utility from being alive and healthy). Each period, 
the subject‘s A unit had a 10% probability of failing and the B units had a 20% chance of failing 
(both B units operated or failed together).  
Before making the donation decision in the first round, all subjects were informed that 
each round began with the subject having $2 and consisted of a number of periods in which they 
could earn more money. Whenever a subject‘s A unit failed, he lost $1 and the round ended for 
                                                           
12 The organ donor registry is rival (or congestible) in that the more people who take advantage of the pool of organs 
make it less likely another person is able to take advantage of it, but this characteristic is shared by other non-
excludable goods (i.e. public parks, roads, and bridges) that are commonly thought of as public goods. 
13 Unlike other games in the experimental literature on excludible public goods (for examples see Kurtis J. Swope 
2002; Matthias Cinyabuguma, Talbot Page and Louis Putterman 2005; and T. K. Ahn, R. Mark Isaac and Timothy 
C. Salmon 2009) our game does not fully exclude non-contributors from accessing the public good but instead 
provides priority to those who contribute. Different potential recipients have different shares in the public good, in 
the sense that different priorities may give them different probabilities of drawing from the public good if need 
arises. In particular, non donors receive a smaller probability of access to the public good. 8 
 
him (representing brain death). When a subject‘s B units failed, he had up to five periods to 
receive a B unit from someone else (representing dialysis, during which time he did not earn any 
money), if a subject did not receive a B unit in those five periods, he lost $1 and the round ended 
for him (again representing death). Subjects could receive a B unit from another player in a given 
period if that player‘s A unit failed in that period while his B units were still active, if and only if 
the player had agreed to donate his B units at the start of that round.  
Subjects made a donation decision 31 times in a fixed group of 12 subjects. Subjects were 
not informed of the number of times they would make the decision but were told they would be 
paid for four randomly selected rounds. The donation decision was always asked at the start of 
the round, before any periods had passed, so subjects made the donation decision before knowing 
whether their A unit or B units would fail first.  
Subjects were randomly assigned at the beginning of the game to have either low or high 
costs of donation (each group of 12 subjects had 6 low-cost donors and 6 high-cost donors) and 
were only informed of their own cost of donation. Low cost donors had to pay $0.40 so that their 
B units would be given to other subjects in the event that they had A unit failure (subjects who 
agreed to be donors always paid the cost, regardless of whether they had A unit failure or B unit 
failure first, representing the psychological costs of donation incurred at the time of the decision 
to register as a donor). High cost donors had to pay $0.80 for their B units to be donated in the 
event of A unit failure. Subjects remained high cost or low cost donors for the entire experiment. 
All subjects were told that if they were a donor and their A unit failed first, each of their 
B units would be donated to a subject who had failed B units and was waiting for a B unit if such 
a subject was present in that period. They were also told that B units could not be donated again 
in the same round (i.e. a donated B unit could not be donated again after the failure of the 
recipient‘s A unit). After making the donation decision, subjects watched their outcome for each 
period of that round and were able to observe if any of their units failed in that period, how many 
periods they were waiting for a B unit, whether they received a B unit in that period, and how 
much money they had earned so far in that round of the game. After a subject could not earn any 
more money in a round, he stopped receiving information each period and waited for the next 
round to begin. Subjects received no information about the donation decisions or earnings of 
other subjects, and subjects were not informed if B units they donated were actually provided to 9 
 
other subjects (i.e. they did not know whether a subject needed a B unit in the period in which 
their A unit failed). 
There were 4 different conditions under which subjects made donation decisions in the 
experiment. In the control condition, subjects were informed that donated B units were provided 
to those who needed B units in the order that those subjects had been waiting for B units: so 
subjects who had been waiting 5 periods would receive an available B unit before a subject who 
had been waiting 4 periods and so on.
14  
In the priority condition (motivated by the donor-priority rules in Singapore and Israel), 
subjects were informed that those who agreed to be donors at the start of the round would be 
given priority should they need to receive a B unit, and that B units would be provided first to 
subjects who had agreed to be donors, and only if no donors were in need of B units would B 
units be provided to subjects who were not donors.  Within each priority group, B units were 
assigned by the length of time subjects had been waiting for B units with those who were waiting 
the longest getting available B units first. The priority condition generated an incentive for 
donating, the value of which depended on the number of other subjects who registered as donors. 
As long at least one other member of the group donated, donors were more likely than non-
donors to receive a B unit if they needed one. In addition, in the priority condition, registering as 
a donor provided a relatively strong positive externality to other donors since they are more 
likely than non-donors to receive donated B units. 
In the discount condition, B units were assigned as in the control condition, but all 
subject costs were $0.35 lower than in the control condition, so low cost donors paid $0.05 to 
donate their B units and high cost donors paid $0.45 to donate their B units. The $0.35 discount 
approximates the expected value of the incentive for donation achieved by the priority rule (and 
the amount paid to donors in the rebate condition, described next) if 5 to 6 donors are 
contributing in a round.
15 This treatment was run to investigate whether the behavior change due 
to the priority rule could be replicated by a discount alone, simply offsetting the costs of 
donation and not generating the positive externalities to other donors. 
                                                           
14  If multiple subjects had been waiting the same number of periods and there were not enough B units for all of 
them, the B units were assigned randomly among the subjects who had been waiting the longest. 
15 Since the average donation rate across all rounds of the discount condition turns out to be 55.4% (implying an 
average of 6.65 donors per round), this $0.35 discount turns out to be remarkably similar to the benefit from 
donating they would have received from donating in the priority condition (in expectation), and to the rebate 
donating subjects would have received if they had been in the rebate condition, described next.  10 
 
In the rebate condition, B units were assigned as in the control condition, but subjects 
were informed that those who paid to be a donor would receive a rebate at the end of the 
experiment based on the number of other subjects in their group who also agreed to be donors. 
(Rebates were reported only at the end of the experiment to avoid giving subjects direct 
information about the number of donors or how that number was changing from round to round, 
since this information was not available in the discount treatment.) This treatment was meant to 
reproduce the incentive effects and the externality effects of the priority condition without 
affecting the allocation of B units. This treatment was run to investigate whether the priority rule 
was changing behavior as a result of the incentives associated with creating a club good. The 
rebate amounts were selected to be the expected value of receiving priority in the priority 
condition of the experiment. The rebate consequently depended on the number of other donors 
(just as the benefits of priority depend on the number of other donors and how many others in 
need of B units also have priority). The rebate amounts were the expected benefit of having 
priority given the probability of A unit and B unit failure in the experiment. The rebate was 
weakly increasing and concave in the number of other donors in that round. Subjects received no 
rebate if they were the only donor and received up to $0.46 if 10 or 11 other subjects in their 
group were donors in that round.
16 This meant that at the time of the donation decision, the 
private incentives in the rebate condition matched the private expected value of the incentives in 
the priority condition. Like being a donor in the priority condition (in which B units are more 
likely to go to other donors) being a donor in the rebate condition had a relatively strong positive 
externality on other donors, which distinguishes it from the discount condition. 
Subjects were not told how many rounds they would play the game, but all subjects 
played 15 rounds in one of the conditions followed by 16 rounds in another condition. All 
subjects played the control condition either for the first 15 or last 16 rounds (36 subjects, in three 
groups, played the control condition in all 31 rounds to test for a restart effect). After the first 15 
rounds, subjects were informed that the rules of the game had changed and any changes in the 
                                                           
 
16 The expected value of receiving priority was calculated by simulating one million rounds of the game for each 
number of donors from 1 to 12 and estimating the earnings of subjects who were given priority and those who were 
not conditional for each number of donors. The rebate profile was: $0 for 0 other donors, $0.10 for 1 other donor, 
$0.20 for 2 other donors, $0.28 for 3, $0.33 for 4, $0.37 for 5, $0.40 for 6, $0.42 for 7, $0.44 for 8, $0.45 for 9, 
$0.46 for 10 or 11 other donors. Note that the return to donation is increasing in the number of other donors up to 
11, reflecting that with these parameter choices there remains a shortage of kidneys even when all possible donors 
are registered. (If there were excess kidneys, so that the queue was always empty, priority on the queue would no 
longer be valuable.) 11 
 
game were explained. Three groups of subjects who had played the first 15 rounds in the control 
condition were stopped after round 15 and told that there were no changes in the rules of the 
game. After round 30, all groups were interrupted and told that they would play the game one 
final time (in the same condition they had been playing for the past 15 rounds). The number of 
groups who played in each of the orderings of conditions is displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Number of Groups (Subjects) in each order of conditions 
 
















































  Control  Priority  Rebate  Discount 
Control  3 Groups (36 Ss)  8 Groups (96 Ss)  5 Groups (60 Ss)  4 Groups (48 Ss) 
Priority  4 Groups (48 Ss) 
No Groups  Rebate  4 Groups (48 Ss) 
Discount  4 Groups (48 Ss) 
 
 
  After all rounds had been played, subjects were informed of which 4 rounds had been 
randomly selected for payment and were informed of any rebate earnings in those rounds (if 




The experimental results are from 384 subjects who participated in the experiment in 32 
groups in one of 23 sessions in the Spring and Summer of 2009.
17 Subjects were students at 
Boston-area colleges and universities. The experiment lasted up to one and a half hours and 
average earnings were $25.87 per subject, including a $10 show up fee. The experiment was 
conducted using z-Tree 2.1.4 (Urs Fischbacher 2007).  
Figure 1 displays the results across all sessions. The graph displays the percent of 
subjects who were donors in each round of the game for each condition (again for exposition, we 
                                                           
17 Subjects played in groups of 12 in sessions of either 12 or 24 subjects. When two groups played simultaneously, 
they received the same order of conditions so all instructions (except for the costs of donating, which differed 
between subjects) could be read aloud. 12 
 
will refer to registering as an organ donor as ―donating‖ or ―being a donor‖). The break in the 
lines after round 15 represents the break in play during which groups may have been switched 
into one of the other conditions. Twenty groups played in the control condition for the first 15 
rounds of the experiment and then either switched to one of the three other treatment conditions 
(17 groups) or stayed in the control condition (3 groups). The other twelve groups played one of 
the three treatment conditions for the first 15 rounds and then switched to the control 
condition for the last 16 rounds. Consequently, for the first 15 periods of the game the control 
line represents the 20 groups who made donation decisions in the control condition—these 
groups went on to all four of the conditions in the second 16 rounds. For the last 16 periods of 
the game, the control line also represents the 15 groups who made donations in the control 





                                                           
18 There were no significant differences in donation in the control condition in the last 16 rounds of the experiment 




























Figure 1: Share Donating by Round
Control Priority Discount Rebate13 
 
 
Figure 1 suggests that the priority condition had a significant positive impact on donation 
rates, starting in the first round in which it was implemented (either round 1 or round 16). In 
round 1, organ donation rates averaged 83.3% for the priority condition and only 35% percent 
for the control condition. In round 16, organ donation rates averaged 79.2% for the priority 
condition and only 28.9% percent for the control condition.  Averaging across the first 15 rounds 
of the game, the priority condition averaged a donation rate of 74.2% while control condition 
averaged a much lower donation rate of 35.9%. Over the last 16 rounds of the game, priority 
averaged 54.0%, while control condition averaged a much lower donation rate of 22.3%. That 
the donation rate in the priority condition is 2 to 2.5 times higher than the donation rate under the 
control condition suggests a significant impact of the allocation rules on donation decisions. No 
additional financial incentives were added to the donation decision, so the rule change increased 
donations at no additional cost, simply providing incentives for the donors in terms of a higher 
probability of receiving a B unit.  
To investigate why the priority condition is so effective at increasing donation rates, we 
ran two additional treatment conditions that provide some of the incentive effects of the priority 
rule.  Compared to the control condition, the priority condition provides an incentive to donate in 
terms of an increased likelihood of getting a B unit when it is needed, and it provides a relatively 
strong positive externality to other donors (since when a subject donates, other donors are more 
likely to reap the benefits).  
The rebate condition captures these two effects, providing the same direct incentives for 
donating as the priority rule. The rebate condition directly replicates the extra earnings that 
accrue to donors in the priority condition (in expectation) and replicates the relatively strong 
positive externality on other donors (also in expectation). The rebate condition does not change 
organ allocation, however, and so does not penalize non-donors with decreased access to B-units. 
The discount condition only provides a decrease in cost for donors relative to the control 
condition but does not provide positive externalities to other donors. The discount of $0.35 
means that in each round donation is still costly, even for the subjects whose initial costs of 14 
 
donation were only $0.40, although much less costly than the control condition.  The discount is 
provided to all donors but does not provide any positive externality to other donors.
19 
Figure 1 shows that the rebate and discount conditions perform differently in the first 15 periods 
(when subjects play the treatment condition first) and the last 16 rounds (when subjects play the 
control condition for the first 15 periods). In the first fifteen rounds of the game, the priority 
condition generates significantly more contribution than the discount, rebate, and control 
conditions. In addition, the discount condition generates significantly more contribution than the 
rebate and control conditions (which cannot be ranked).
20 When implemented in round 16 of the 
game (after 15 rounds of the control condition), the priority, rebate and discount conditions all 
have similar effects (and all outperform the control condition).
21  
That the priority condition performs so much better than the rebate condition when 
implemented at the start of the experiment is particularly striking when we consider that the 
rebate provides the same incentives as the priority rule and that the rebate does just as well as 
priority after subjects have become familiar with the game (by playing 15 rounds in the control 
condition). We want to avoid over-fitting the theory to our experimental data, but while we think 
of the priority and rebate conditions as being essentially the same on the most relevant 
dimensions, there are a number of small differences between the conditions that might explain 
why the priority rule outperforms the rebate condition in round 1 of the game and not in round 16 
(after the subjects have played 15 rounds in the control condition).  
The private benefits of priority and the rebate condition depend on the number of other 
donors in a given round, and subjects in the two conditions get different information about the 
number of other donors over the course of the experiment. In the priority condition, subjects who 
are donors in a given round are more likely to receive a B unit when they need one (and thus are 
more likely to get information that others are donating while the experiment is still ongoing). In 
the rebate condition, however, donors are no more likely than a non-donor to receive a B unit, 
and rebates are only received at the end of the experiment, after all decisions have been made. 
                                                           
19 The two treatment conditions (rebate and discount) that involve a decrease in the costs of becoming an organ 
donor should be seen as relative costs, since the psychological costs underlying the decision to become an organ 
donor are hard to measure. The lesson from these treatments is that lowering costs has a significant, positive effect 
on behavior.  
20 Probit tests on donation rate (without additional controls) and with standard errors clustered by subject find over 
the first 15 rounds that: Priority > Discount (p=0.015); Discount > Rebate (p=0.003); Rebate = Control (p=0.205). 
21 Probit tests on donation rate (without additional controls) and with standard errors clustered by subject find no 
differences between Priority, Discount and Rebate over rounds 16-31 (p>0.1 for all tests). 15 
 
Thus, the positive reinforcement of receiving a B unit is likely to be more effective at 
encouraging donors in the priority condition (where the B units are more likely to go donors, 
who learn about them in a timely way) than in the rebate condition (where B units are not more 
likely to go to donors, and rebates are only paid at the end).
22 This difference in information is 
most stark at the start of the game, since subjects without experience do not have any 
information about the number of donors while subjects with 15 rounds of experience may have a 
much better perception of the number of donors, since they have observed how often they 
received a B unit when they needed one over the 15 rounds in the control condition for 15 
rounds. 
Of the mechanisms that we examined in the lab, the priority allocation rule is the most 
effective at increasing organ donation rates when implemented at the start of the experiment and 
it is as effective when implemented after subjects have become familiar with the game. In 
addition, it is worth noting again that we can implement the priority rule outside of the lab, but 
we do not know how to decrease the psychological costs of registering to be an organ donor. 
Also, legal constraints prohibit the use monetary payments like cash rebates to compensate for 
registering to be an organ donor. We will discuss these issues in the conclusion. 
Table 3 demonstrates the results from Figure 1 in a regression analysis, estimating the 
probability the subjects chose to be a donor in each of the conditions. In addition, Table 3 
displays results about the between-subject effect of being a high cost donor. Finally, the random 
failure of A and B units in each round allows for a more-in-depth analysis of the motivations for 
being a donor across rounds.
23  
                                                           
22 This is consistent with models of reinforcement learning such as those explored in Roth and Ido Erev (1995) and 
Erev and Roth (1998). 
23 Table 3 reports linear probability models using OLS regression specifications with robust standard errors clustered 
at the subject level. The results are qualitatively the same whether we add session dummies, or cluster at the group 
level, or cluster by round. The results are also qualitatively the same if we include subject dummies (although this 
specification prevents estimation of between-subject variables that do not change over the course of the experiment, 
like the effect of having a high cost of donating). In addition, the results are qualitatively the same when we specify 
Probit rather than a linear probability model. While the linear probability model is inefficient, it is unbiased and we 
use robust standard errors to address the heteroskedasticity of the error terms. In addition, none of our specifications 
imply estimated probabilities less than 0 or greater than 1. The linear probability model is the primary specification 
since the regressions are meant to demonstrate the differential average effects across the treatments and since Probit 
specifications can introduce bias in estimates of interaction terms (see Chunrong Ai and Edward C. Norton 2003 for 
an explanation of the bias and for a correction). We also estimated coefficients for each interaction using a Probit 
specification and the correction proposed in Norton, Hua Wang and Ai (2004) and the coefficients are almost 
identical to those estimated by the linear probability model (i.e. all coefficient estimates are quantitatively similar 
and therefore we never estimate a different sign or a different level of significance from the linearly probability 
model when using the corrected Probit).  16 
 
The significant positive coefficients on Priority, Rebate, and Discount in regression (1) 
show that across all 31 rounds, subjects are 14 to 31 percentage points more likely to donate 
when they are in one of the three treatment conditions than in the control condition (representing 
roughly 50% to 100% more donations than the 30% donation rate in the control condition), 
results that are highly statistically significant. Including all of the rounds in the analysis in 
regression (1), Priority outperforms Rebate (p<0.01) and Discount outperforms Rebate 
(p=0.017), but Priority and Discount are statistically indistinguishable (p=0.254). 
Regression (2) separates the effect of the treatment into the first half and the second half 
by including a control Second Half that is equal to 1 in rounds 16 to 31 and is interacted with the 
treatment conditions. Donation is about 14% less likely in the second half of the experiment 
(Second Half is negative and significant). The positive coefficient on Second Half*Rebate 
represents the Rebate condition working particularly well in the second half of the experiment, 
after subjects have experience with the game from playing in the Control condition for 15 
rounds. Using estimates from regression (2), we find that Priority outperforms Discount and 
Rebate in the first 15 rounds of the experiment but the three are indistinguishable in the second 
half of the experiment.  
Regression (3) additionally controls for whether the subjects had randomly been assigned 
the high cost of donating ($0.80) rather than the low cost ($0.40). The coefficient on High Cost is 
negative and significant, suggesting that facing a donation cost that is $0.40 lower makes 
subjects 6% more likely to donate.
24 The variable High Cost is also interacted with all three 
treatment conditions. The only significant coefficient on these interaction terms are for the 
Discount condition, which suggests that the Discount condition had a more significant impact on 
the low cost donors than on high cost donors. The Discount condition may have been particularly 
appealing for the low cost donors since the discount decreased the cost of donation to only $0.05 
each round for the low cost donors.  
 
                                                           
24 The estimate of 6% for the between-subject effect of lower costs is small relative to the within-subject effect of 
26%, as estimated in regression (1) that results from a $0.35 discount being implemented. This difference may be 
due to a difference in information. Subjects have only private information about own donation costs but information 
about the discount is made publicly, so subjects may infer changes in the donation behavior of others that reinforces 
their own donation decisions. 17 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priority 0.306 0.383 0.395
(0.029)*** (0.041)*** (0.048)***
Rebate 0.143 0.062 0.083 0.080
(0.030)*** (0.050) (0.058) (0.059)
Discount 0.255 0.249 0.327 0.321
(0.034)*** (0.045)*** (0.055)*** (0.057)***
Second Half -0.136 -0.136 -0.133
(0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Second Half*Priority -0.066 -0.066 0.000
(0.066) (0.065) 0.000
Second Half*Rebate 0.172 0.172 0.169
(0.081)** (0.081)** (0.081)**
Second Half*Discount 0.030 0.030 0.032
(0.077) (0.073) (0.074)




High Cost*Rebate -0.042 -0.046
(0.060) (0.061)
High Cost*Discount -0.155 -0.158
(0.063)** (0.064)**
Recipient Last Time 0.054
(0.019)***
Earnings Last Time 0.005
(0.002)***
Earned from Receipt Last Time 0.004
(0.004)
Constant 0.298 0.359 0.390 0.359
(0.016)*** (0.020)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)***
Observations 11904 11904 11904 9312
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.07
Table 3: Donation by Condition
Linear Probability Model (OLS)
Robust standard errors, clustered by subject are in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Independent Variables: Priority, Rebate and Discount are dummy variables representing the 
treatment; Second Half is a dummy variable equal to 1 for rounds 16 to 31; High Cost is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the potential donor faced the $0.80 cost rather than the $0.40 cost; Recipient 
Last Time is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject received a B unit in the last round; Earnings 
Last Time are earnings from the previous round (excluding the costs of donating); Earned from 
receipt last time represent the earnigns associated with the receipt of a B unit in the previous 
round.18 
 
  Regression (4) investigates the role of receiving a B unit in this round on donation in the 
following round. Receiving a B unit is the only way a subject can get positive information about 
the donation decisions of other subjects (if his A unit fails first, he does not see any information 
about the donations of others; if his B unit fails first and he never receives a B unit, he gets 
negative information about the number of people in his group that are donating their B units). 
Regression (4) excludes data from the Priority condition since the probability of getting a B unit 
in that treatment is correlated with the decision to be a donor. The coefficient on Recipient Last 
Time is positive and significant, suggesting that subjects are about 5% more likely to be a donor 
when receiving a B unit in the previous round. The higher probability of donation after receiving 
a B unit is driven in part by the positive news and in part due to the additional earnings of a 
subject who receives a B unit, since higher earnings in a previous round increase the likelihood 
of donating (Earnings Last Time is positive and significant). However, there is no additional 
increase in the likelihood of donation when the earnings came after a B unit was needed and 
received (Earned from Receipt Last Time is not significant).   
   
III. Simple Model 
  The experimental results demonstrate that the priority rule implemented in the priority 
condition had a significant positive impact on donation in the experiment. The priority rule 
provides an incentive for registration as an organ donor within the organ allocation system. To 
help interpret the effect of the priority rule, we develop a simple model to examine the 
equilibrium impact of introducing this incentive and we conduct welfare analysis. Compared to 
the game subjects played in the experiment, the model makes three simplifying assumptions for 
analytical tractability. 
  First, the model collapses the game into two periods. The stochastic process by which A 
units and B units fail in the experiment is complicated, but it is not essential to understanding the 
effect of the priority rule. In the experiment, all subjects decide whether to donate before the first 
period of each round and so their decisions are made before they have received any information 
about the failure of their units or any information about their payouts. Thus, the stochastic 
process allows subjects to observe the period-by-period outcomes that generate the final payoff 
in the round, but each round has first a decision period followed by a payoff (accumulated over 
potentially many periods as determined by the stochastic process and donation decisions of other 19 
 
subjects). The model presented here collapses this into a two-period game. In the first period, 
subjects simultaneously make donation decisions, and all payoffs are revealed in the second 
period. 
  Second, we model the agents as a continuum rather than the 12-person groups used in the 
experiment. Usually when making this leap we need to take into account that in a small group an 
agent‘s contribution impacts his own payoff (while it does not in a continuum of agents). In our 
setting, however, a subject can never give himself an organ. Consequently, in the laboratory 
experiment, as in a continuum of agents, a subject who donates does not increase his likelihood 
of getting a B unit by increasing the organ supply, while donation in the priority condition 
increases priority in the continuum model as in the lab. 
  Third, the model assumes that all agents know the distribution of costs agents face for 
donating. As will be discussed below, this cost collapses the direct cost of donating and any 
altruism or positive feelings associated with making a donation, which means the cost can be 
negative. In the laboratory experiment, subjects only know their own monetary cost of donating 
($0.40 and $0.80 as randomly assigned by the experiment) and not the distribution of these costs 
or any warm glow laboratory subjects might feel from donating. 
      To summarize, we model the decision to register as an organ donor as a two-period 
game. In the first period, a continuum of agents decide whether to register as an organ donor. In 
the second period, agents realize their health states, their organ outcomes (whether they receive 
an organ if they need one), and their payoffs. 
An agent‘s health state is either: (1) dead from brain death (and in a position to donate an 
organ if the agent had registered as an organ donor), which occurs with probability      ; (2) in 
need of an organ (we assume that everyone who needs an organ needs only one), which occurs 
with probability      ; or (3) neither, which occurs with probability              . If an agent 
is in need of an organ, he also realizes his organ outcome. He either: (1) receives an organ (for 
simplicity all donated organs are treated as identical) or (2) does not receive an organ. The 
number of organs made available by the brain death of an agent is  , and the probability of 
receiving an organ depends on the decisions of other agents in equilibrium. 
The first part of the payoff is associated with an agent‘s health and organ outcome. This 
part of the payoff is normalized to be 0 when the agent is in need of an organ and no organ is 
received, and the payoff is normalized to be       when an agent is in need of an organ and 20 
 
receives one. The assumption that all agents are homogeneous in their value of receiving an 
organ is not necessary, and we will weaken the assumption when analyzing welfare. The payoffs 
for all other states of the world are unrestricted, since they never enter the decision problem. 
The second part of the payoff is the cost associated with registering as an organ donor, 
which is additively separable from the payoffs from health and organ outcomes. Agents incur a 
cost of registering as an organ donor   that combines the direct costs of registering (for example, 
fear of worse medical treatment or discomfort the agent feels from thinking about his own death) 
with the benefits of being a donor (for example altruism or warm glow from registering as a 
donor). We assume a continuum of agents with cost of donating      ( ) where   can be less 
than 0 so that some agents get a private benefit from donating. 
 
Baseline Case 
In the baseline case organs are assigned randomly to anyone who needs one. There is no 
incentive for an agent to register as an organ donor and the share of agents who become organ 
donors in equilibrium depends only on their costs of registering as an organ donor. Only agents 
with a cost c ≤ 0 choose to register as donors. There is no additional incentive to register as a 
donor before priority is introduced, so                               ( ). 
A   share of agents end up needing organs and a share   of agents suffer from brain death 
and are in a position to donate   organs each, but only if they have previously registered as an 
organ donor. Since the share of registered donors is  ( ), the equilibrium probability of 
receiving a kidney conditional on needing one is        {
  
   ( )  }. 
Notice that when        ( ) then      , so all agents who need an organ receive one. 
To model an environment like the one in the U.S. today, where there is excess demand for 
organs, we assume in all that follows that        ( ), so that not enough organs are provided in 
the equilibrium without a priority rule or some other intervention. 
 
Priority for registered donors 
With the introduction of a donor-priority rule there is a benefit to registering as an organ 
donor. Under a donor-priority rule, agents who have registered as donors get priority for any 
available organs, and those who are not registered donors only receive an organ if all registered 21 
 
donors who need an organ receive one. (If there are not enough organs for all agents in a priority 
group, then any available organs are assigned randomly among members of that priority group.)   
The priority and rebate conditions of the experiment mirror the case of donor-priority in 
the model in that being an organ donor generates an incentive that is a function of the number of 
other donors. In the priority condition, being a donor increases the likelihood of receiving an 
organ when one is needed. In the rebate condition, being a donor generates a cash benefit 
equivalent to the expected value of having priority in the priority condition.
25 
It should be noted that if  ( )    , so that no agents have a cost of contribution of 0 or 
less, then there is always an equilibrium in which no one registers as a donor, even under a 
donor-priority rule. This equilibrium exists since an agent can never give an organ to himself, so 
there is no donor-priority benefit to being the only registered organ donor. Notice that this does 
not result from assuming a continuum of agents; even with a finite number of agents, an agent 
can never donate an organ to himself. Consequently, we focus on the case  ( )    , so that at 
least some agents prefer to register as an organ donor even without donor priority and the no-
registration equilibrium does not exist. This assumption mirrors the data in our experiment, in 
which agents registered as donors even in the control condition, and the data for organ donation 
in the U.S., where 37% of eligible adults are registered as organ donors in the absence of a 
donor-priority rule.  
We define the probability that a registered donor who needs an organ gets one as   . 
Under the donor-priority rule, with  ( )    ,    is 
        {
  
 
  } 
where   can now be interpreted as the share of registered donors who need organs (which is of 
course the same as the share of the general population). 
We look for a cutoff equilibrium in the cost space, where    is defined as the cost at 
which agents are indifferent between registering as an organ donor and not registering. All 
agents with        choose to register and all agents with        choose not to register. Agents 
who do not register do not get priority and, if they need an organ, receive one with probability 
                                                           
25 As noted above, the experiment has many periods within each round that are collapsed into one payoff period in 
the model. 22 
 
  , which is the share of remaining organs (      ) (  ) divided by the share of agents who are 
not registered donors but are in need of an organ  (     (  )) or 
        {     {
(      ) (  )
 (     (  ))
  }} 
Note that        if       , since all the donated organs are going to registered donors who 
ended up needing an organ. Equilibrium requires that 
       [  ( (  ))     ( (  ))] 
so that the agent who has cost    is indifferent between not registering, which generates no cost 
and no benefit from registering, or registering, which generates a cost    and increases an agent's 
probability of receiving an organ (and thus increases the probability of a payout of V) by 
 [       ] where   is the probability of needing an organ and         is the increase in 
probability of receiving the organ with priority.  
Notice that the equilibrium depends on whether agents who are not registered donors ever 
get an organ in equilibrium, this is equivalent to whether 
  
      or 
  
     . We can think of 
  
   as 
the ―production-need ratio‖ of organs. When  
  
     , registered donors who suffer brain death 
produce enough organs to supply organs to all the registered donors who need organs and some 
organs go to people who are not registered donors. 
When 
  
      then      
  
  , so not all registered donors receive an organ when they need 
one (unless 
  
     ). In this case,        . Thus equilibrium requires        [
  
     ]       
So agents contribute when they have         and in equilibrium the share of agents who 
contribute is  (   ). Notice that if  (   )    ( ), then there are more donors under the donor-
priority rule than in the baseline case. Donor priority introduces a positive incentive for 
registering as a donor in the form of a higher likelihood of receiving an organ if it is needed, 
which encourages donation. 
When 
  
     , all registered donors who need an organ receive one and there are organs 
available for some non-registered agents as well. In this case,         and      
(    ) (  )
 (   (  ))   
(since we have assumed that        ( ), which rules out       ). This means that in 
equilibrium  23 
 
       [   
(      ) (  )
 (     (  ))
] 
 
which implies that 
 (  )  
       
         
This condition defines    and implies that F(  ) < 1 (since        in this case), so not all 
agents register as organ donors. Consequently,        and         
  
  . We can see that        
since        is ruled out by the assumption that  ( )  
 
  .  
The 
  
      case demonstrates the countervailing forces to register as a donor present 
under the donor-priority rule. First, there is an incentive for individuals to register as a donor in 
the form of a higher likelihood of receiving an organ if it is needed, which encourages donation. 
Second, there is a countervailing force in that the extra donors generated by the priority rule are 
producing more organs for those who are not registered donors, so as more people register or 
more organs are provided, the chance of getting an organ when not registered increases.
26 
Depending on the ―production-need ratio‖ of organs, the share of agents who are 
registered as organ donors is given by 
 (   )    
  
 
    
 (  )  
       
             
  
 
    
  
 
                                                           
26 While not described in detail here, the model makes possible comparative static analysis on the number of donors 
that identifies differences between the donor-priority allocation rule and the current allocation rule without priority. 
Under the donor-priority rule, the number of donor registrations responds to increased success in recovering organs 
by increasing until enough organs are recovered that those without priority also have positive probability of 
receiving an organ, after which it decreases. The number of organ registrations also increases in response to an 
increase in the rate of organ failure, until so many organs are failing that all organs go to registered donors, after 
which there is no change in the donation rate as the organ failure rate continues to rise. Finally, as the value of 
transplantation compared to non-transplantation increases (e.g. through better surgical techniques that promise 
longer survival of the transplanted organ), so does the rate of donation under the donor-priority rule. In contrast, 
under the rule without priority, the registration rate does not vary in response to the recovery rate, the incidence of 
disease, or the increased benefit of transplantation. While not modeled here, it is possible that the ―warm glow‖ that 
some part of the population feels from the decision to register as a donor may respond to these changes in 
parameters under both a donor-priority rule or in the baseline case. 24 
 
The effect of decreased costs 
  A decrease in the cost of donation, as implemented in the experiment in the discount 
condition, serves to decrease the cost for all agents. This change in the cost of donation would 
increase the share of agents who register as donors by increasing the share of agents who have 
negative costs.  
For example, if the distribution of original costs    ( ), then a decrease in costs of   
generate a net cost of donation of      . Now, donors who have an original cost of       are 
willing to register, leading to a share of agents  ( ) who register as donors, which generates 
   ( ) kidneys. If  ( )    ( ) then the decrease in costs increases the probability an agent 
receives an organ if one is needed from        {
  
   ( )  } to        {
  
   ( )  }. 
 
Welfare Analysis 
  The model as formulated above allows for a welfare analysis of different policies that 
affect the number of organ donors. A social planner interested in maximizing the sum of welfare 
of the continuum of agents is concerned with the welfare benefit of receiving a kidney, V, 
weighted by the probability that it is needed and received, and the welfare cost associated with 
being a deceased organ donor, c, which may be negative. Total welfare can be written as the sum 
of these two terms: 
 (  )     [   (  )     (     (  ))]    [       (  )] (  ) 
where    and    are again the probabilities that registered donor and non-registered donors 
(respectively) receive an organ if they need one. Again    is the cutoff cost such that those with 
       register as organ donors and those with        do not. The first term is the benefit of 
receiving an organ when it is needed and the second term is the expected cost of registering as a 
donor multiplied by the share of the population that registers. The first term calculates the 
probability of receiving an organ as the sum of the probability of getting an organ when 
registered as a donor,   , times the share of agents who are registered donors  (  ) plus the 
probability of getting an organ when not registered as a donor,   , times the share of agents who 




Welfare in the baseline case 
Without a donor-priority rule,              
  
   ( ) and        so welfare simplifies to 
            [       ( )] ( ) 
       [
  
 
 ( )]    [       ( )] ( ) 
         ( )    [       ( )] ( ) 
Since the only people who register as donors when there is no donor-priority rule are 
those who have a negative cost of donation,        and        if  ( )    . 
 
Welfare with donor priority 
With a donor-priority rule, both the cases above generate welfare with the same general 
form. As noted above, when 
  
      then      
  
  , so (unless 
  
     ) not all registered donors 
receive an organ when they need one. In this case,        ,         , and welfare is 
 
   
  
        [   (   )]    [         ] (   ) 
Alternatively, when 
  
     , all registered donors who need an organ receive one and 
there are organs available for some non-registered donors as well. In this case,        ,     
 
(    ) (  )
 (   (  ))  ,        [   
(    ) (  )
 (   (  )) ], and  (  )  
     
       , so welfare is therefore 
 
   
  
         [ (  )  
(      ) (  )
 (     (  ))
(     (  ))]    [        ] (  ) 
Notice that welfare in both cases simplifies to the same form, where 
       [   (  )]    [        ] (  ) 
and          or        [   
(    ) (  )
 (   (  )) ], depending on the case.  
In addition we can compare welfare under a donor-priority rule to welfare in the baseline 
case. We rewrite welfare under a donor-priority rule     as as  
       [   ( )     ( (  )    ( ))]    [       ] ( )    [            ][ (  )    ( )] 
which implies that 
           (       [            ])[ (  )    ( )] 
Essentially, the change welfare associated with switching from the baseline case to a 
donor-priority rule is the share of donors induced to donate by the priority rule  (  )    ( ) 26 
 
times the difference of the expected benefit from each additional organ donor,    , and the 
average cost of donation for these new donors  [            ]. While the two cases (with 
respect to 
  
  ) are different, the welfare gain is never negative since the cost of a marginal donor 
is never greater than the benefit from donating. Welfare is strictly increased whenever there is a 
positive measure  (  )    ( ) of new donors.  
The welfare change associated with introducing a donor-priority rule when 
  
      and 
thus          is weakly positive. We can see this by noting that (in this case) the donors with 
the highest cost of donation,        , incur a cost that is equal to the benefit that they create in 
extra organs. Any agents who have c in the range             generate a net welfare gain by 
choosing to become donors. Consequently, the welfare gain of the priority rule  
  
  
           
  so long as at there are agents with   in the range            .  
When 
  
     , however,        [   
(    ) (  )
 (   (  )) ]           , with the last inequality 
arising from the condition that       . This means that fewer people are donors in equilibrium 
when 
  
      than when 
  
     . This decrease in share of donors arises from the weakening of 
incentives associated with having priority when 
  
        In this case, some non-donors get 
organs, which decreases the benefit of priority. Thus, the highest cost incurred by a donor in this 
case is below the expected benefit created by their donation. Thus  
  
  
              whenever 
 (  )    ( ), whenever the are agents with c in the range           . 
 
Welfare with decreased costs 
  There are two ways that the social planner can decrease costs: by somehow manipulating 
the underlying distribution of  ( ) or by providing transfers that decrease the net costs of 
contributing. 
If the social planner can directly decrease the costs of donation by manipulating  ( )  say 
by increasing the warm glow from giving or alleviating psychological costs of contribution, she 
can increase welfare by doing so. A decrease in the costs of donation for all agents: makes all 
previous donors better off by making previously negative costs more negative, makes some 27 
 
previously positive costs negative getting new agents to donate, and makes some agents better 
off because they receive the organs generated by the new donors. 
If instead agents‘ costs of donation are lowered through transfers (and assuming there is 
not a cost of raising the revenue for the transfers or a cost of implementing them) the welfare 
benefit of decreasing the costs of donation is a function of the number of new organs created 
minus the added costs for new donors. We can compare welfare under the first-best transfer with 
welfare under the donor-priority rule.  
If 
  
     , the optimal transfer will achieve organ donor registration from anyone who has 
        (i.e. a cost less than or equal to the expected benefit of the organs the registered donor 
creates). So the optimal decrease in costs is        . Notice that in this case, the donor-priority 
rule achieves the same first best outcome as the optimal transfer policy. If 
  
     , then the 
expected benefit of generating a new donor is     until a share of agents   is donating such that 
       , which implies that everyone is getting a kidney who needs one (and so new donors do 
not increase welfare). Consequently, to maximize welfare the social planner wants to induce 
everyone to enter who has         so long as  ( )    . The social planner sets   such that 
        and  ( )  
 
    or         and  ( )  
 
  . Notice that in this case, the social planner 
can achieve the first best with a transfer while the donor-priority rule generates fewer donors 
than is optimal, since some non-donors get organs from donors, which weakens the incentive of 
having priority. 
 
Welfare with value priority 
  The donor-priority rule uses organ allocation to create an incentive for organ donation. 
However, there are other ways one might use organ allocation to increase welfare. One proposal 
is to assign deceased donor organs to maximize expected life years of the recipients rather than 
to purely satisfy a first-come-first-served allocation procedure (Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network 2011).  
  To demonstrate the relative benefit of a donor-priority rule and a policy that allocates 
deceased donor organs to those who value them the most (a value-priority rule) we need to 
introduce heterogeneity in the value of receiving an organ into the model. We do this simply by 
assuming there are two types of agents, those who have a high value from receiving an organ 28 
 
   and those who have a low value   . The difference in value for an organ can derive from 
agents being at different ages or different quality of health when the need for an organ arises. We 
call   the share of the population that has    and redefine           (     )   to be the 
average value of receiving an organ (the expected value of receiving an organ before an agent 
knows his type). 
  To make the contrast between donor priority and value priority most stark, we assume 
that agents do not know their value when they make their organ donation decision (otherwise, 
those who have a high value for organs would get a larger expected benefit from donation under 
a donor-priority rule and donor-priority would work to achieve sorting on value as well).  
  We compare the welfare under the donor-priority rule with welfare under a value-priority 
rule and look for conditions when one outperforms the other. We have already solved for welfare 
under a donor-priority rule, since it does not distinguish between high and low value recipients, 
we can treat each organ as having its expected value   
       [   (  )]    [        ] (  ) 
where          when 
  
      and        [   
(    ) (  )
 (   (  )) ] when 
  
     . 
Welfare under a value-priority rule depends on whether    ( )    , so all organs go to 
high value types or whether    ( )    , so some organs go to low value types. We can solve 
for welfare in each case: 
       ( )          ( )    [       ] ( ) 
       ( )             [   ( )    ]    [       ] ( ) 
  We look for the conditions under which the donor-priority rule outperforms the value-
priority rule in each of the cases. We start first with    ( )    . We can see that      
       ( )        
    (  )    [        ] (  )        ( )    [       ] ( ) 
Which simplifies to  
         (       [            ])
[ (  )    ( )]
   ( )
 
and can be rewritten as  
        
        
   ( )
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This result demonstrates that donor priority outperforms value priority as long as the high 
value,   , is not too much larger than the average value,  .  
We can now investigate the case where    ( )    . We can see that      
       ( )        
 [   (  )]    [        ] (  )           [   ( )    ]    [       ] ( ) 
Which simplifies to  
         (       [            ])
[ (  )    ( )]
       ( )
(
     
 
) 
and can be rewritten as 
        
        
       ( )
(




        
        
       ( )
 
Which shows that donor priority outperforms value priority as long as the average value, 
V, is not too much larger than the low value,   .  
Again depending on the parameters of the model, the donor-priority rule or the value-
priority rule will be optimal. The basic tradeoff is that a donor priority rule produces more 
organs, but does not necessarily allocate them to the recipients who would gain the most from 
them. 
One could also imagine taking advantage of both donor status and value in organ 
allocation. For example, organs could be assigned first based on donor status and then, within a 
priority class, based on value; or, organs could be assigned first based on value and then based 
on donor status within a priority class. While we do not formally address these cases, they would 
further leverage allocation policy to enhance welfare. 
   
Experimental Parameters 
Our experimental game has the same structure as the 2-period model outlined above. 
Subjects make registration decisions in period 1 and then payoffs are revealed. However, the 
payoff ―period‖ has a more complicated structure and occurs over a number of periods instead of 
one. In our experiment, payoffs are generated by a stochastic process in which subjects suffer 
from B-unit failure with a 20% probability in each period and suffer brain death with a 10% 30 
 
probability in each period. Rather than collect and distribute all organs simultaneously, we 
introduce more complicated timing and allow subjects who have B-unit failure to survive for up 
to 5 periods without a B unit, during which time they may receive a B-unit and earn a stochastic 
payoff that is a function of the number of periods they survive after that. 
Since the payoffs in the game are complicated, it is most useful to simulate the payoffs 
associated with priority. Figure 2 shows the expected benefit of receiving priority under the 
priority rule for different parameter values (based on 10 million simulations of each number of 
other donors for each set of parameters). The parameter values vary the probability of A-unit and 
B-unit failure for groups of 12 players who each have two B units available for donation when 




The top-most rebate profile is the benefit of having priority with the parameters actually 
used in the experiment. Notice that the benefit to having priority is increasing with the number of 
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significant benefit to having priority. One can interpret this feature of our payoffs as suggesting 
that there is a significant waiting list for organs (and so there is always a benefit to having 
priority). Notice that while the payoff structure in our experiment guarantees that under a priority 
rule, a subject who is not a donor cannot get a B unit in a period when a subject who is a donor 
needs but does not receive one. However, the payoffs in the experiment are more complicated 
than in the model, which is a simplified version of both the experimental game and actual 
decisions to donate. Consequently, the rebate profiles in Figure 2 representing the benefit of 
priority collapse the benefits and costs and simply represent the benefit of priority, which is most 
similar to the value in the model of 
  [  ( (  ))     ( (  ))] 
The functions in Figure 2 demonstrate the benefit to priority under different parameter 
values, which make the probability of brain death relatively higher (similar to increasing  ) or 
the probability of organ failure lower (similar to decreasing  ) or both.
27  
If the only costs the subjects face for registering as a donor in the experiment are the 
financial costs imposed in the experiment (and if subjects do not have altruistic or warm glow 
motive for donating) then in our experiment the only equilibrium of the game is for no one to 
register as a donor, even under the priority and rebate rules. Each group of 12 subjects had 6 
subjects who had a donation cost of $0.40 and 6 subjects who had a donation cost of $0.80. Since 
the expected benefit of priority when 5 other subjects are contributing is only $0.38, there is no 
equilibrium in which these 6 low-cost subjects all contribute. However, we see many subjects 
registering as a donor even without priority, suggesting that there may be altruism or warm glow 
associated with the decision to register as a donor. In the case of heterogeneous costs, in which 
some agents contribute in the absence of a priority rule, we expect priority and the rebate 
conditions to generate more contribution than the control condition in equilibrium, which is what 
we observe in the experimental data. 
 
Lifesharers 
                                                           
27 In the three functions that lie below the rebate profile used in the experiment, the benefit to priority peaks in the 
interior, so while there is always a positive benefit of priority, it is not always increasing in the number of other 
donors. While the model assumed a distribution of costs of registering as an organ donor, if all subjects had a 
common cost of registering as an organ donor, there would be certain common costs at which a mixed strategy 
equilibrium would exist in which only some agents registered as organ donors and everyone was indifferent between 
not getting priority and incurring the cost of registering in order to get priority.  32 
 
With the model providing intuition about behavior with and without priority rules, we can 
consider other proposals similar to the donor-priority rule discussed here. For example, the 
Lifesharers club has formed in the United States to provide priority-type incentives for 
registering as a donor and joining the Lifesharers club. Individuals who join Lifesharers and 
register as organ donors commit to directing their deceased organs to other members of 
Lifesharers who might need them.  
Notice that if the existence of the Lifesharers club were widely known and if registering 
as an organ donor automatically registered an individual in Lifesharers at no cost, the club would 
replicate the donor-priority rule discussed here. However, the existence of the Lifesharers club is 
not widely known, and while there is no financial cost to joining the club, there may still be a 
cost of informing your next of kin that you are a member of the club (and that they will inherit 
the task of enforcing your wishes to have your organs be offered first to other members of 
Lifesharers) or similar psychological costs to joining Lifesharers as with registering as an organ 
donor. As soon as there is an additional cost of joining Lifesharers, there is an equilibrium at 
which no one joins, since there is no benefit to being the only member of Lifesharers (and little 
benefit to being one of few members). Introducing a priority system nationally eliminates this 
non-participation equilibrium, since registering as a donor in a national donor-priority system 
provides priority access to the organs provided by all those people who chose to register as 
donors together with all the additional unregistered donors whose next of kin decide to donate 
their organs.  
 
IV. Discussion 
The donor-priority rule significantly increased registration rates for organ donation in our 
experiment. When implemented at the start of the game, the priority rule was more effective at 
increasing donation rates than either the rebate or the discount. When implemented after subjects 
were familiar with the game, the increase in registration rates generated by the priority rule was 
also achieved by the discount that directly decreased the costs of donation and by the rebate that 
provided the same incentive for registration as the priority rule, and the same positive 
externalities to other donors, in expectation.  
The rules for allocating deceased donor organs present a complex problem, because they 
determine not merely who receives the next available organ, but may also influence how many 33 
 
organs become available, by influencing the decisions of potential donors. As in other areas of 
market design involved with exploring incremental improvements to complicated existing 
institutions, it is necessary to think about how any proposed change will interact with existing 
rules and procedures (cf. Roth 2002, 2008). One reason this paper focuses on donor-priority rules 
is that we think that these might fit well with the existing legal and procedural institutions. 
In this respect it is worth noting that there are other ways to change policy that could 
increase the number of registered organ donors. For example, one proposal that has received a 
good deal of attention would change the current ―opt in‖ registration method used in the United 
States to an ―opt out‖ system in which everyone is presumed to be a donor unless he or she 
actively indicates otherwise.
28 Another proposal, ―mandated choice‖ would require everyone 
(e.g. who applies for a driver‘s license) to specifically indicate whether they wished to be a donor 
or not. We want to briefly argue here that the priority rule that we consider may create a more 
direct link between registration as an organ donor and subsequent successful organ recovery and 
transplantation than policies that change the procedure by which individuals register as organ 
donors.  
Attempts to increase organ donation rates by changing the default organ registration 
status (and adopting an ―opt out‖ policy) would surely generate more organ donor registrations, 
since those who do not take any explicit action would automatically be registered as donors (see 
Eric J. Johnson and Daniel G. Goldstein 2003, 2004, who find direct evidence that registration 
rates are higher with an ―opt out‖ system).
29 However, such a policy may weaken the link 
between the registration decision and the legal clarity of the potential donors‘ last wishes. Under 
current United States gift law, changing the default status is likely to have legal consequences 
that could be detrimental to organ retrieval.   
Since the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 (UAGA), an individual can make his or 
her own legally binding decision to be an organ donor after death, which does not require the 
                                                           
28 Switching to an ―opt out‖ system might not be easy, as shown by the so-far-failed attempt to do so in Britain. In 
2008, senior British politicians supported changing British organ donation registration from an ―opt in‖ to an ―opt 
out‖ system, but faced considerable opposition (http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2008/11/british-organ-donation-
opt-in-versus.html). Sheila M. Bird and John Harris (2010) report on the continued effort to change the system. 
Similarly, in a speech announcing a new organ donor registry in California, Governor Schwarzenegger said an opt 
out system had been suggested to him, but that an opt-out system was not plausible due to constitutional concerns 
(http://gov.ca.gov/speech/16126/). 
29 Manipulation of defaults in choice situations has been shown to be a powerful force in changing behavior in many 
settings (see Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler 2007 and Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 2008).   34 
 
consent of next of kin (Alexandra K. Glazier 2009). However, a donor symbol on a driver‘s 
license has not been considered sufficient evidence of the deceased‘s intent to donate to proceed 
without permission from the next of kin. Aside from the fact that the driver‘s license is often not 
available in a timely way, the law allowed that a registered donor could have changed his or her 
mind about donation subsequent to the issuance of the driver‘s license (Glazier 2006).  
In recent years, computer registries have allowed for fast checks of organ registration 
status. They also provide individuals with a way to easily change their organ donor status online, 
which allows the presence in the registry to be interpreted as intent to donate. The legal status of 
the anatomical gift has meant doctors can recover donated organs without receiving explicit 
permission the next of kin (see Glazier 2006). In contrast, a donor registration that does not 
reflect a positive decision to donate (as under an ―opt out‖ policy) might not be taken as evidence 
of the deceased‘s intent in the legally compelling way that registration is currently. Under an opt 
out policy, approval from next of kin might again become necessary for an organ to be 
transplanted.
30 
A ―mandated choice‖ system would also change the way in which individuals became 
registered donors (see Thaler and Sunstein 2008 and Thaler 2009). Under ―mandated choice,‖ 
every individual who registered for a driver‘s license (or potentially other state or federal 
documentation) would be required to indicate that he will be an organ donor or that he will not. 
While there is suggestive evidence that a ―mandated choice‖ policy would (like ―opt out‖) 
generate more registration of organ donors (Johnson and Goldstein 2003, 2004), similar concerns 
arise about whether a change to mandated choice would lead to more donated organs and 
transplants. While the UAGA makes registering to be a donor legally binding under an ―opt in‖ 
policy, failing to register as an organ donor is not a legally binding decision, whereas registering 
as a person who declines to donate could be legally binding on the next of kin.
31 Discussions 
with the staff at the New England Organ Bank suggests that they are able to recover organs from 
                                                           
30 In addition to finding high rates of willingness to register in a survey of potential organ donors, Johnson and 
Goldstein (2003, 2004) also suggest that more organs are recovered and transplanted in European countries that have 
―opt out‖ systems. Bruno Deffains and Jean Mercier Ythier (2010) argue, on the other hand, that the success of 
organ recovery rates in Spain (which has the highest recovery rates in Europe) is not due to the ―opt out‖ system but 
to the way in which the Spanish transplant system has professionalized the harvesting of organs, by specialists who 
do nothing else. See also Kieran Healy (2006). 
31 Mandated choices could of course be framed so that a negative decision was merely recorded as a decision ―not to 
register as a donor at this time,‖ but even this less binding formulation might inform next of kin‘s beliefs about the 
deceased‘s intentions and wishes. 35 
 
about half of all non-registered potential donors in New England by approaching next of kin. 
This means that more than half of the people who are not currently registered under ―opt in‖ 
would need to choose ―yes‖ in mandated choice to increase the recovery rate. Consequently, it 
remains an empirical question whether a change to ―mandated choice‖ would generate more 
organ transplants.  
Even though registration under ―opt out‖ and ―mandated choice‖ systems may raise legal 
concerns about the intent of registrants under the UAGA, changing the procedure by which 
individuals register as donors may still be a fruitful avenue to pursue to increase organ donation 
and recovery.
32 Gift laws can also potentially be changed to address any legal concerns that 
might arise from new policies. We simply see these legal issues as additional hurdles to monitor 
and overcome in successfully implementing a change in registration policy. One attraction of the 
donor-priority rule is that it seems to avoid these particular hurdles since it preserves the current 
donor registration process as is (and thus is consistent with current United States law regarding 
donor intent at time of death).  
Although changing priority rules would involve a regulatory rather than a legislative 
process, a change such as we consider here would nevertheless involve substantial debate and 
principled opposition. Much of the opposition would likely have to do with thinking of priorities 
as reflecting justified claims. For example, we would not feel that a serial killer serving a life 
sentence who happens to be a registered donor would have a more justified claim to a scarce 
organ than an exemplary citizen who happened not to be registered as a donor. And, under a 
donor-priority system, there would likely be opposition if there were disparity across groups in 
the opportunity to register and receive priority. 
While comparing the different mechanisms in our experiment, the priority rule, rebate, 
and discount all generate an incentive to donate that offsets the costs of donation. But the priority 
rule has an advantage over the rebate and discount, namely priority rule seems feasible and can 
be implemented without any additional costs to the system. In contrast, decreasing the costs of 
registering to be an organ donor may be difficult (both to understand the costs and to decrease 
them) and decreasing net costs through monetary incentives is not currently allowed by the U.S. 
National Organ Transplant Act and by similar legislation in many countries. 
                                                           
32 Some of the U.S. states have been pursuing these avenues independently. In New York, a discussion has recently 
begun about the potential to switch to an opt out system (see http://www.dailynews.com/news/ci_14970110) and 
Illinois has had a mandated choice system in place since 2006 (see Thaler 2009). 36 
 
Decreasing the costs of registering to be a donor is a particular challenge in part because 
the costs are hard to identify. Since the physical removal of the organs only occurs after death 
and since the monetary costs are not borne by the donor‘s estate, it is unlikely that the costs are 
physical or monetary. Additionally, the costs appear to be more substantial than transaction 
costs, since registering to be an organ donor in most states only requires checking a box at the 
time of receiving a driver‘s license (and the registration rates remain low while the benefits to 
others are substantial). These facts suggest that the costs of registering to be an organ donor are 
most likely psychological costs.  
The psychological costs may involve fear of improper medical treatment if registered as 
an organ donor. A national survey of 5,100 adults conducted in January 2010 on behalf of 
Donate Life America found that 52% of survey respondents believe doctors will try less hard to 
save them and 61% of survey respondents believed they might have their organs removed when 
they might still come back to life.
33 (We have not seen evidence consistent with these beliefs, but 
regardless of whether this is properly labeled as a ―psychological‖ cost, it is a cost that seems 
difficult or impossible to decrease. For example, attempts to dispel such beliefs about worse 
medical treatment of organ donors may only serve to strengthen it or introduce it into the minds 
of others). In addition, deciding to be an organ donor requires an individual to think about his 
own death, which may itself generate psychological costs. It remains unclear how these costs can 
be effectively lowered.  While future research should certainly investigate the costs to registering 
to be an organ donor and how policies aimed at decreasing these costs might work, allocation 
policy that implements a priority rule is likely to increase registration rates, even with the current 
costs in place.
34 
Care must always be taken in extrapolating experimental results to complex 
environments outside the lab, and caution is particularly called for when the lab setting abstracts 
away from important but intangible issues, as we do here. However the difficulty of performing 
comparable experiments or comparisons outside of the lab makes it sensible to look to simple 
experiments to generate hypotheses about organ donation policies. The results of our experiment 
                                                           
33 Based on the Donate Life America National Donor Designation Report Card 2010. 
34 Changes in allocation policy may have additional benefits beyond the incentives of higher priority in motivating 
individuals to register as donors. Contracts between agents have been shown to establish social norms that can lead 
to more prosocial behavior (Judd B. Kessler and Leider 2011). By providing a benefit (in terms of higher priority for 
deceased donor organs) an allocation policy like the one in Singapore may act as an implicit contract, setting a social 
norm of behavior at registering to be a donor. 37 
 
lend support to the hypothesis that the priority rule used in Singapore and being introduced in 
Israel is a potentially powerful policy tool. Results from this experiment suggest that it performs 
as well as or better than discounts and rebates that are of a similar magnitude to the benefits of 
priority, and that, along with other policies, it is a plausible mechanism to increase rates of 
registration.  
In conclusion, we note that many scarce resources are allocated via queues. One of the 
things that makes organs for transplantation unusual in this respect is that the way the queues are 
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